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The aim of this chapter is to explore the changing perceptions of EU Cohesion policy 
by Europe’s diverse regions, and the opportunities it has created for subnational 
engagement. Much has been written about the ways in which the reform of the 
Structural Funds in the late 1980s brought regions into the ambit of EU decision-
making, thereby leading to new forms of ‘multi-level governance’ (Marks 1992; 
Hooghe 1995; Jeffery 2000; Marks and Hooghe 2001; Piattoni 2009). However, less 
attention has been given to how the regions themselves used the opportunities 
presented by Cohesion policy, and European integration more generally, to meet their 
own political aims (Lynch 1996; Elias 2009; Hepburn 2010).  
The main question this chapter seeks to address is thus: how have sub-state 
regions mobilized on the issue of EU Cohesion policy? This discussion explores the 
changing attitudes of regional actors towards European integration over time, and how 
this has been linked to EU Cohesion policy. It begins by reflecting on the cautious 
(and at times hostile) approach adopted by sub-state regions towards the European 
project in the 1970s and early 1980s. It then considers the ways in which the reform 
of Cohesion policy – also known as the ‘regional policy’ of the EU – began to be 
correlated in the minds of regional actors with an institutionally reformed ‘Europe of 
the Regions’ during the 1990s. At this point, the economic and political empowerment 
of the regions – through receipt and implementation of EU regional development 
funds, as well as access to European decision-making – were seen to go hand-in-hand.  
However, two ‘critical junctures’ altered this path of regional mobilisation on 
European integration. First, the continuing weakness of regional representation in 
European institutions disappointed regional actors which had hoped for a stronger 
voice in Europe. This perceived weakness of regional representation was exemplified 
through the purely consultative role of the Committee of the Regions (see Chapter 12, 
this volume) and the strengthening  of member-state powers in European treaties to 
the perceived detriment of the regions. Second, EU enlargement to Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) deprived many regions in the ‘West’ – where autonomy-
seeking regionalist parties were more active – of Cohesion policy funds, thereby 
reducing some of the economic incentives for regional support for Europe. In 
response, many regionalist actors adopted more critical stances on Europe as well as 
more radicalized constitutional aims, leading to several independence referenda. 
This chapter therefore charts the ways in which Cohesion policy was 
intrinsically linked to the ‘rise and fall’ of a Europe of the Regions (Hepburn, 2008). 
It explores how the reform of the Structural Funds in 1988 created new economic and 
political opportunities for regional recognition, and subsequently how these regional 
opportunities appeared to dwindle away. Finally, the chapter reflects on the current 
stance of regionalist parties on Europe, which have moved from seeking soft forms of 
autonomy in a Europe of the Regions to demanding outright independence. Recent 
plebiscites on independence in Scotland, Catalonia and elsewhere have created a 
headache for EU actors, in that there is no guidance in the current treaties on how to 
deal with ‘internal’ enlargement. This chapter raises the question of whether the EU is 
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itself partly responsible for the rise of independence referenda, in that there had been 
an opportunity for the EU to accommodate demands for softer forms of regional 
autonomy in the 1990s, but this opportunity slipped through its fingers. 
 
Early Regional Frustration with Europe 
Very few regional political actors have had a consistent line on Europe – either 
persistently and unconditionally embracing the European project on one hand, or 
steadfastly rejecting every aspect of Europe on the other. Instead, regionalist actors 
have tended to alter their positions on Europe over time, and often even in a cyclical 
manner, in response to developments at the supranational and domestic levels 
(Hepburn, 2010; Elias, 2009). Taking the introduction of European Parliament 
elections as our starting point, the first ‘phase’ in regional mobilization on Cohesion 
policy may be described as the ‘pre-structural fund reform’ period, which lasted from 
the late 1970s to the late 1980s.  
 During this first period, regional actors – in particular, parties of all political 
stripes at the regional level – were largely unconvinced by the evolving European 
project. Certainly, the introduction of direct European Union Parliament elections 
required political actors at the regional (and indeed state) level to take European 
issues more seriously, and to carve out more substantive positions on European 
policies (Hooghe and Keating, 1994; Ladrech, 2002: Bulmer and Burch, 2000). 
However, many regional-level parties across Europe – including autonomy-seeking 
regionalist parties -  perceived the European Economic Community (EEC) as a 
distant, elitist and bureaucratic organisation, which was run by states for states alone 
(Elias, 2009). As there were no direct channels for regions to influence decision-
making in Brussels, many regional parties felt peripheralised from the new centres of 
economic and political power (Hepburn, 2010). In turn, regional governments, 
parliaments and political parties demanded more influence in Brussels – through 
direct and indirect (i.e. state delegation) channels (Jeffery, 1997, 2000). This demand 
for more access to and influence over European decision-making was a common 
refrain amongst all regional-level parties, regardless of their ideological orientation 
(see Hepburn, 2010).  
However, the regionalist parties on the centre-left had an additional fight to 
pick with Brussels: they opposed the capitalist underpinnings of economic integration, 
and the deleterious effects of the single market on poorer regions. This critique was 
evident, for example, in the party rhetoric of the Scottish National Party (Hepburn, 
2006), Plaid Cymru—Party of Wales (Elias, 2008a), the Galician Nationalist Bloc and 
Andalucian Party in Spain (Elias, 2006; Montabes et al. 2006; Gómez-Reino, 
Llamazares & Ramiro, 2008), Sardignia Natzione – Sardinia Nation in Italy 
(Hepburn, 2010), and the Corsican National Liberation Front in France (Hepburn and 
Elias, 2012). These regionalist parties feared the exacerbation of economic 
inequalities and their lack of control over economic integration. In particular, there 
were concerns about how traditional regional economies would be adversely affected 
by the requirements of the common agricultural policy (CAP) and fisheries policy 
(CFP) (see Elias, 2009; Hepburn, 2010). To that end, European integration was seen 
as exacerbating regional economic development problems and isolating regional 
actors from decision-making. 
 
Structural Fund Reform and the Regions  
However, these negative views of Europe changed with the 1988 reform of the EU 
structural funds, which marked a critical juncture in regional attitudes to Europe. The 
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period from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, which can be described as the immediate 
‘post-structural reform’ phase, saw regions embrace new opportunities for 
engagement in European structures.  
As other chapters in this volume have explored in greater depth (such as those 
of Brunazzo, Leonardi and Begg), the EU has instigated a range of regional policies 
aimed to rectify spatial inequalities resulting from market integration since the mid-
1970s. EU regional policies existed in parallel to state regional development policies, 
which since 1945 had been implemented on a top-down basis by European states in 
order to integrate poorer areas into the national economy (Sharpe 1993; Keating, 
1996; Bullman 1997). At the EU level, regional problems were first identified 
following the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which was 
seen to benefit some regions and disadvantage others (Hooghe and Keating, 1994). 
The European Regional Development Fund was established in 1975, entailing the 
distribution of funds on the basis of member state quotas (see Chapter 1, this volume). 
However, this policy constituted little more than an inter-state transfer mechanism 
(Keating 1996), and it was criticized by regional actors for its failure to establish a 
European-wide distribution of resources, or to create mechanisms to send monies to 
target regions. As such, regional policy during this period was under-developed, 
under-funded and almost entirely under the control of member-states. 
The 1988 reform of Community regional policy dramatically altered this 
situation (Moravcsik 1991; Bache and Jones, 2000). Un-coordinated regional 
development policies were expanded and transformed into a more cohesive regional 
development programme, primarily in response to the need to cope with increased 
economic disparities following EEC enlargement to the Mediterranean and Ireland. 
Regional policy was thus re-formulated and concentrated territorially to improve the 
competitive potential of less developed regions. Moreover, Cohesion policy was 
linked to European President Jacques Delors’ aim of creating a stronger social 
dimension to European integration, as a counterbalance to the free-market thrust of 
the single market.  The social rationale behind regional policy was part of the general 
concept of ‘cohesion’, which had been introduced into the Single European Act of 
1985 (Hooghe and Keating, 1994). 
The outcome of the 1988 reforms was to double the amount allocated to 
structural funds – which pooled together the European Regional Development Fund, 
the European Social Fund and the European Agricultural and Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund – making it the second largest item on the EU budget (Hooghe and Keating, 
1994). The European Commission also adopted a stronger leadership role in 
determining priorities and programmes, giving regional policy a stronger pan-
European orientation and reducing the control of individual member-states (ibid). 
Furthermore, two important principles became the bedrock of the new policy: (1) 
subsidiarity, whereby decision-making was to be exercised at the lowest possible 
level (which often meant the regional level); and (2) partnership, which necessitated 
the involvement of the EU, state and regional authorities in coordinating policies. The 
latter principle was especially important as it gave regions direct access to European 
decision-making, so that regional policy was not just for the regions but by the regions 
(Nannetti, 1996). As such, ‘the 1988 reforms created a range of openings for regional 
mobilization. The region was confirmed as the key organizing principle in EU 
cohesion policy’ (Hooghe and Keating, 1994: 376). 
 
Multi-level Governance and Regional Engagement  
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The inclusion of a regional ‘third’ level of government in EU decision-making (on 
regional policy) – alongside states and the EU – was seen by many to hasten the 
development of a system of multi-level governance (MLG). This term was first 
introduced by Gary Marks (1992) in an analysis of how the reform of the EU 
structural funds in 1988 had created opportunities for regions to engage in EU policy-
making and implementation. Thus the initial treatment of the concept was to explain 
how regional tiers of government had been brought into the ambit of European 
decision-making through ‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested 
governments at several territorial tiers’ (Marks 1993: 392). Regional participation in 
European affairs presented a third level of decision-making - alongside the national 
and supranational levels – and thus decision-making was diffused across multiple 
political levels, arenas and contexts (Piattoni, 2009).  
 Hooghe (1996: 9) argues that regional (or ‘subnational’) interest formation in 
the EU has been an important indicator of the nature of the Euro-policy. This 
perception is part of Hooghe’s broader argument that ‘multi-level governance is the 
only model where regions would be a governmental level of importance next to the 
national, European and local arenas. This Europe cannot be one of the national states, 
nor of the regions, but only a Europe with the Regions’. Although it is debatable 
whether the structural funds have truly empowered the regions, EU reform of regional 
policy was seen to encourage the articulation of ‘political demands in regional terms 
and provided objects for political mobilisation’ (Hooghe and Keating 1994: 370).  
From the 1980s onwards, there was a proliferation of regional European-wide 
organisations including pro-regional lobbies, inter-regional associations, and cross-
border associations (Keating, 1998). EU regional intervention was seen to result in a 
surge of ‘bottom up’ regional mobilisation, whereby regions were pressing for a 
greater role in state and European policy-making (Weyand 1997). There were a 
number of ways in which regions sought access to EU decision-making bodies. The 
creation of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) in 1994 by the Maastricht Treaty 
provided a political arena for voicing regional demands. The CoR, which remains 
largely a consultative body, nevertheless created the first formal recognition of 
regional governments in the EU (Jeffery, 1997). In addition, over 225 regional 
information offices have been established in Brussels since 1985, in order to lobby 
European institutions, monitor EC regulations and support regional proposals in 
European political processes (Tatham and Thau, 2013). Finally, the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) granted regional governments the constitutional ability to represent member-
state interests within the EU Council of Ministers. Thus, scholars have argued that 
regionalisation was a direct outcome of Europeanization (Sturm and Dieringer 2005). 
However, Hooghe (1996) also found that regions – understood specifically as - 
regional executives – did not have uniform opportunities or capacities to access 
European decision-making. Instead, some regions have been able to mobilize their 
demands in Europe more effectively than others. In particular, the larger, wealthier 
regions with significant legislative powers have been more successful in influencing 
EU policy than smaller, poorer administrative regions (Hooghe, 1996). Hooghe and 
Keating posited that regionalist mobilization has been weakest in Objective 1 regions, 
especially on the periphery and in southern Europe. This is due to a number of factors, 
including their weaker ‘economic importance, their political skills, their 
administrative infrastructure and their ability to mobilize civil society behind the 
efforts of regional governments’ (Hooghe and Keating, 1994: 375).  
In addition, some research has found that regions that have greater  control 
over regional policy are able to access European decision-making channels  more 
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effectively than those with limited control in a centralised ‘gatekeeper’ state (Bache 
and Jones, 2000). To illustrate, scholarship has found that the Scottish 
Executive/Government – which has enjoyed exclusive competence for regional policy 
– has been able to forge a much stronger relationship with the European Commission 
than the Spanish regions, where the central-state has monopolized this relationship 
(Bache and Jones, 2000; MacPhail, 2008). Finally, the ability to represent member 
states in the Council is restricted to a small handful of regions in Belgium, Austria and 
Germany (all federal states), and is certainly not a uniform right (Skoutaris, 2013). 
However, this discussion is not only interested in the activities of regional 
executives, which has been the focus of much of the literature on ‘regions in Europe’ 
like that described above, but also the attitudes of regionalist actors – that is, parties 
with specific demands for enhanced autonomy – towards the European project. 
Jeffery (2000: 8) argues that sub-national authorities (SNAs) ‘are typically portrayed 
[in MLG] as essentially inconsequential and passive players until either an incidental 
by-product of central state-EU interplay provides an opportunity for mobilization, or a 
central government decision is taken which passes decision-making powers down to 
SNAs’. In other words, in the author’s view, MLG casts regions as inert objects of 
decision-making, folded into institutional structures, which are unable to change their 
position in the hierarchical structure. There is no account of how regions themselves 
seek to change the dynamics that facilitate European policy and structural change. To 
fill this gap, this discussion follows in the footsteps of Keating et al (2003) and 
Bukowski et al (2003) by considering how regional political parties (in both 
government and opposition at the regional level) have mobilised on European issues, 
and linked the reform of structural funds and the new opportunity structures to access 
EU decision-making with a ‘Europe of the Regions’. 
 
Europe of the Regions 
While academics – and the European Commission itself – began to talk about multi-
level governance processes, regional political parties began to evoke the imagery of a 
‘Europe of the Regions’ as an aspiration to meet their specific demands for self-
determination. Europe appeared to hold the possibility of new forms of autonomy in 
an age of interdependence, as well as promises of material resources. In this sense, 
EU regional policy – and the institutional opportunities for engagement that it 
presented – was a significant element in the glue that adhered regional-level parties to 
the European project in the late 1980s.  
 In a special issue of Regional & Federal Studies (2008) entitled ‘Whatever 
happened to a Europe of the Regions?’ scholars demonstrated how sub-state 
regionalist parties became the most ‘vociferous advocates’ of a Europe of the Regions 
in the 1980s and early 1990s (Elias, 2008b). Individual regionalist parties had very 
different motivations for supporting a Europe of the Regions, which included 
functional goals (access to European structural funding and other resources), 
constitutional goals (being linked to federalism, devolution and independence), and 
discursive goals (such as being perceived as legitimate pro-European actors) 
(Hepburn 2010). However, on a general level, regionalist parties viewed changes at 
the European level – such as the reform of the structural funds and the creation of a 
Committee of the Regions – as positive. As Elias argues, such developments were 
‘hailed by these actors as evidence that a very different kind of European polity was 
being built, one which would see Europe’s small nations and regions assume a central 




More specifically, EU Cohesion policy was of value to regionalist parties for 
both symbolic and functional purposes. On a functional level, a primary goal of 
regionalist parties is the economic empowerment of the region (Hepburn, 2009). The 
European Commission’s offer of greater economic assistance was lauded by regional 
actors. This was especially true in poorer regions whereby, for example, regionalist 
parties in Sardinia (Italy), Wales (UK) and Andalusia (Spain) perceived EU Cohesion 
policy as a solution to problems of economic underdevelopment and infrastructural 
weakness. The reform of the structural funds in 1988 qualified Sardinia for ‘Objective 
1’ status, making it a main priority of EU Cohesion policy as it had a GDP of less 
than 75% of the European average. Sardinian political parties were enthused with the 
injection of new funds, though in some ways the funds replaced the island’s economic 
dependency on the Italian state with a new dependency on Europe (Hepburn, 2009). 
Similarly, Andalusia was classified as Objective 1 after the structural funds reform, 
becoming the top Spanish region in receipt of EU funding. The Andalucian Socialist 
Party, which believed that Andalucia had been economically discriminated against by 
the Spanish state, began to view EU Cohesion policy as a valuable source of funds 
(Montero, 2001). In Wales, Plaid Cymru viewed the reform of the structural funds as 
a positive development in the EU’s recognition of the economic needs of the poorest 
regionsin Europe, and lauded the significant amount of funds to be invested in the 
country’s rural and deprived urban areas (Elias, 2009: 64). These cases appear to 
confirm the argument put forward by Hooghe and Keating (1994) that ‘EU cohesion 
policy has become the niche for the demands of weaker and poorer regions’. Though 
at the same time, regionalist parties in wealthier regions – including Catalonia, the 
Basque Country and Scotland – were also strongly positive about the receipt of EU 
structural funds (Bache and Jones 2000; Hepburn, 2006, 2010).   
 Clearly, then, Cohesion policy offered material gains to regions, but it also had 
an important symbolic dimension. Regional parties and executives adopted a variety 
of demands for autonomy in Europe that amounted to something less than sovereign-
state independence (Keating 1996; Elias, 2009; Hepburn 2010). These demands were 
brought under the umbrella term ‘Europe of the Regions’, which had both policy and 
constitutional implications. On one hand, it signified the possibility of realizing policy 
demands, such as economic resources, regional representation and increased control 
over regional competences. On the other, it became the constitutional leitmotif of 
regional parties, symbolising widespread frustration with the predominantly 
intergovernmental workings of the EU which failed to recognize the rights and 
identities of regions and stateless nations (Hepburn, 2010).  
 To return to some of our cases, in Scotland the EU became attractive to parties 
seeking constitutional reform, and in particular, the imagery of a ‘Europe of the 
Regions’ was linked to the creation of a Scottish Parliament. The SNP also looked 
more favourably at the security and trading opportunities that Europe afforded, 
adopting a policy of independence in Europe in 1988 (though it also briefly toyed 
with the idea of a regionalized Europe in 1994) (see Hepburn, 2006, 2009). In Wales, 
Plaid Cymru became a strong advocate of a Europe of the Regions as it offered ‘a 
feasible way forward for a small nation seeking to free itself from the centre-
periphery conflict with the British state, but without having to become a fully 
independent sovereign state’ (Elias, 2009: 57). Elsewhere, in Sardinia, Catalonia, the 
Basque Country, Veneto, Galicia, Andalucia, Bavaria and Brittany, regionalist parties 
of all political stripes began supporting the goal of self-determination in a Europe of 
the Regions or Peoples (Jolly, 2007; Elias, 2009; Hepburn, 2010). But it wasn’t only 
regionalist parties that began to link regional autonomy with Europe – regional 
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branches of Christian Democratic and centre-left parties across Europe also became 
firm advocates of a Europe of the Regions (Hepburn, 2009, 2010).  
The 1988 reform of the structural funds was therefore strongly linked with the 
possibilities for regional engagement in Europe, encapsulated in the imagery of a 
Europe of the Regions. This ‘phase’ in regional mobilisation in Europe lasted from 
1988 until 1994, the latter date marking the creation of the Committee of the Regions. 
Regionalist actors saw Brussels as a new centre of resources to access, and an arena 
for advancing their constitutional demands and policy interests. In particular, 
autonomy in Europe seemed to offer a third way between independence and state-
centralism. I have argued elsewhere that the imagery of a ‘Europe of the Regions’, 
which was flexible enough to mean different things to different regional actors, led to 
a convergence of regionalist demands in Europe (Hepburn, 2008, 2010). However, 
this convergence was ultimately unsustainable.  
 
The Convention, Enlargement and Regions ‘Left Behind’ 
While reformed Cohesion policy and possibilities for regional engagement in Europe 
encouraged regionalist actors to become Euro-enthusiasts in the early 1990s, from the 
late 1990s onwards certain events and processes began to shatter this optimism. These 
EU-level developments included: (1) the limitation of opportunities for regional 
engagement in Europe; and (2) European enlargement, which corresponded with a 
decline in Cohesion policy funds and political representation for regions in western 
Europe. Regionalist frustration with the Committee of the Regions (CoR) was 
probably the first indicator that a Europe of the Regions was unlikely to become a 
reality. The CoR was intended to give sub-state actors a formal role in European 
decision-making processes (Van der Knapp, 1994). However, it had significant 
limitations. Firstly, the CoR was an advisory body with little control over policy; this 
made the CoR a largely symbolic institution with highly truncated reach and influence 
(Christiansen, 1996; Loughlin, 1996). Secondly, because the membership of the CoR 
was so diverse – including both heavyweight legislative regions and tiny 
administrative regions with few powers – this led to internal tensions and divisions, 
which served to fracture the body (Jeffery 2000; McCarthy, 1997). Finally, the CoR 
suffered from ‘functional overreach’, that is, having to give too many opinions on too 
many issues, without any real influence over EU policy (Christiansen, 1996; 
Loughlin, 1996). As a result of these weaknesses, the CoR faced a ‘downward spiral 
of progressive obscurity and the frustration of its members’ aspirations’ (Christiansen 
1996).  
 Another disappointment to regional political actors was their failure to obtain 
guarantees for regional recognition in the Convention on Europe, which formed the 
basis of the draft European constitution (see Elias 2009; Hepburn, 2010). Regionalist 
parties – such as the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, Convergencia i Unio, the 
Galician National Bloc, the Basque Nationalist Party and the Bavarian CSU – 
criticised the draft European constitution for failing to recognise the multinational 
character of member states, or granting regions more rights in European decision-
making. Instead, the inter-governmental nature of the European project was seen to be 
reinforced. Moreover, the principle of subsidiarity – which was key to the 1988 
structural reforms in promising a redistribution of policy competences across different 
territorial levels – was seen as an empty shell (Elias, 2006). As a result, some 
regionalist parties – such as the SNP – threatened to oppose the constitution 
(Hepburn, 2010). In any case, the failure of the constitution appeared to signal the end 
of the need to discuss any deepening or reform of European political integration. 
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 Thirdly, regionalist parties became increasingly concerned that European 
integration was disempowering them. This was most evident in Bavaria, where the 
CSU sought to put a halt to the transfer of more and more Länder competences to the 
European level (Jeffery, 1997). Indeed, in Bavaria the idea of a ‘Europe of the 
Regions’ was linked by the CSU to concerns about protecting the interests of the 
German Länder (Hepburn 2008, 2010). The CSU proposed that European integration 
must go hand-in-hand with the protection of regional rights (Bauer 2006). But when 
these rights failed to materialise, the CSU tried a different tack, by reforming the 
German federal state to limit the effects of unwanted EU directives on regional 
competences, or as Jeffery (2004) argues, to strengthen the ‘hard shell’ of the state to 
protect the regions.  
Together these three issues – CoR weakness, lack of regional recognition in 
the Treaties, and perceived threats to regional competences – sounded the death knell 
of a ‘Europe of the Regions’. But regionalist actors were not just concerned about the 
lack of political rights and representation. They were also anxious about the reduction 
in material benefits to regions. In 2004, during the same year that the draft European 
Constitution had spelled out the dominance of states (and the correlative continuing 
weakness of regions) in the European project, enlargement to Central and Eastern 
Europe brought ten new member-states into the embrace of the European project.  
At first, many regionalist parties were enthusiastic about welcoming new 
countries from CEE into the European club. Parties such as the SNP and Plaid Cymru, 
welcomed, in particular, the inclusion of small states – such as Malta, Cyprus, Estonia 
and Latvia (all with less than 1.5m inhabitants) – which undermined the arguments of 
anti-regionalist critics that places like Scotland or Catalonia were ‘too small’ to join 
the European club. Furthermore, regionalist parties also welcomed the increased 
ethnic and linguistic diversity that eastern enlargement would bring, which – it was 
hoped – would strengthen the legal and political case to recognize such diversity 
everywhere, including amongst the regions themselves (Elias, 2009). Finally, the 
political grouping representing regionalist parties in the European Parliament, the 
European Free Alliance (EFA), saw enlargement as an opportunity to increase its 
membership amongst eastern parties and thus increase the weight of regionalist 
demands in the European Parliament (Lynch and de Winter, 2008). 
However, as eastern enlargement became a reality, regionalist parties in the 
west became aware of new challenges that this entailed. First, enlargement resulted in 
a reduction of MEPs in the ‘old’ member-states to accommodate new MEPs from 
CEE. This meant that many regions where regionalist parties were highly active – 
such as Wales, Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders – lost elected representatives and 
political clout in the European Parliament. Second, there was a slow realisation that 
even though enlargement had brought several new member-states into the EU, ‘there 
was little prospect of a similar status being extended to other small nations already in 
the EU as part of larger Member States’ (Elias, 2008). The fact that there were several 
small independent countries – smaller than Bavaria, Scotland or Catalonia, but with 
more European representatives – underlined the inequality of territorial representation 
in Europe. Third, the European Free Alliance (EFA) extension into CEE had been 
problematic, due to the lack of strong regionalist parties there (Lynch and de Winter, 
2008). Instead, most of the new MEPs from CEE joined the ‘traditional’ class-based 
Europarties.  
 The final problem with eastern enlargement for (western) regionalist actors 
brings us back to the issue of EU Cohesion policy. With the addition of ten new 
member-states, which generally had less developed economies than the ‘old’ 
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members, the EU average GDP fell. This had implications for the eligibility rules for 
Objective 1 status in the structural funds. Under the 75% rule for eligibility, several 
designated regions in the ‘old’ member states dropped out, as the average fell with the 
inclusion of lower-income countries. This meant that poor regions – such as Sardinia, 
Andalusia and Wales – were tipped over the 75% threshold and denied Objective 1 
status, despite their own GDP not having risen in real terms.  These regions received 
transitional, ‘phasing out’ support during the 2007–13 period (Begg, 1998, 2008). 
 As many of the regions (where regionalist parties were active – such as 
Scotland, Wales, Andalusia, Sardinia) lost their eligibility for priority EU Cohesion 
policy funding, this had two effects. Firstly, the withdrawal of European funds 
removed an important ‘carrot’ with which regionalist parties were trying to ‘sell’ the 
European project to their members and supporters. As we saw earlier, the economic 
benefits offered to regions by structural funds had been an important element in the 
conversion of regionalist actors to Europe in the 1990s. When funds were reduced, 
regionalist parties had less reason to see the direct benefits of European integration.  
Secondly, regionalist parties had accepted some of the negative effects of the 
common agricultural and fisheries policies because they were being compensated 
through the structural funds. When the structural funds were removed, regionalist 
party criticisms of these other policy areas became more pronounced. For instance, 
the SNP’s opposition to the European fisheries policy became more strident, Plaid 
Cymru and the Partito Sardo d’Azione (Psd’Az) criticised the common agricultural 
policy for undermining their farming methods and dairy quotas, and the Bavarian 
CSU criticized EU competition policy for undermining its ability to support 
traditional sectors in its economy (see Elias, 2009; Hepburn, 2010). So although few 
regionalist parties in western Europe directly criticized the phasing out of structural 
funds in order to address inequalities in CEE, there was a subtle shift in regionalist 
party discourse that downplayed the benefits of Cohesion policy and increased their 
criticism of other common policies that were viewed as detrimental to their economies 
(for an excellent quantitative analysis correlating regionalist parties’ declining support 
for European integration with declining levels of structural funds, see Chapter 12 in 
this volume). 
  
Independence Demands and European Responses 
As a result of the apparent ‘closing’ of opportunities for regions to act in Europe, lack 
of regional recognition in European treaties, threats to regional competences and 
declining levels of funds and representation (for Western regions), most regionalist 
parties abandoned their dreams of a Europe of the Regions. It was clear to many that 
the supranational project remained very much a Europe of the States.  
In addition, regionalist parties began to change their discourse on European 
integration. A new Eurocritical, or indeed even Eurosceptical, strain seeped into the 
discourse of many regionalist parties, which became critical of certain aspects of 
European integration – including the lack of democratic accountability and the 
detrimental effects of certain common policies (Hepburn, 2008, 2010; Elias, 2009). 
Furthermore, many regionalist parties changed their constitutional goals (ibid). In 
particular, for many regionalist parties that felt ‘left behind’ in the onward march of 
European integration, they changed their aims to seek full member status.  
 In the period 2008-14, regionalist parties in several EU countries submitted 
bills to regional executives to hold referenda on breaking up the state so that the 
region could finally take its place at the ‘top table’ of the EU Council of Ministers.  
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To take a few examples, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) – a previous 
Europe of the Regions advocate – put forward a bill to hold an independence 
referendum in 2008. Although this was passed by the Basque regional assembly, the 
bill was struck down by Madrid as unconstitutional (Humlebaek, 2015). In 2012, the 
Psd’Az in Sardinia – also a previous Europe of the Regions enthusiast - failed by one 
vote to pass an independence referendum bill in the Sardinian regional assembly, but 
with a pledge to repeat the motion again (Hepburn, 2015). In March 2014, a number 
of  Veneto regionalist actors formed the umbrella group ‘Plebiscito 2013’ to organize 
an unofficial referendum on independence, with a majority of participants voting to 
leave Italy (Cento Bull, 2014). Although the results and turnout were strongly 
questioned by media and political commentators, the Liga Veneta-run regional 
assembly – in response to the referendum - passed a bill to hold a formal referendum 
on independence in June 2014, though at the time of writing no date has yet been set 
for this (Hepburn, 2015).  
In September 2014, the SNP organized a referendum on independence in 
Scotland, in which it lost by a margin of 10 points (55% against, 45% in favour). The 
SNP has since drastically increased its electoral support in Scotland and has pledged 
to hold another referendum on independence if it obtains the democratic mandate to 
do so (Hepburn and Rosie, 2015). Finally, a number of Catalan nationalist parties 
including the CiU – which had also been a previously strong advocate of a Europe of 
the Regions – organized a non-binding vote on independence in November 2014. The 
Catalan authorities had previously planned to hold an official referendum on 
Catalan’s future, but this was suspended by the Spanish Constitutional Court for being 
illegal. The unofficial poll was a success for Catalan regionalists: 80% of those who 
participated (about 2 million people) voted in favour of independence with a turnout 
of 37% (Smith, 2014; Lineira & Cetra, 2015).  
These independence referenda have created a number of problems for the 
European Commission. Although the EU’s official position was ‘neutral’, in the sense 
that it did not want to intervene in the affairs of its member states, if these referenda 
are successful they will have major implications for the European project. In 
particular, the EU will have to develop a position on ‘internal’ enlargement, if the 
citizens of regions wish to gain sovereign-state status.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how EU Cohesion policy, which was a vital component in 
the conversion of regionalist actors to the European project, also became associated 
with the downfall of a Europe of the Regions. Certainly, the opportunities that the 
reform of the structural funds created for regional engagement in EU decision-making 
were unprecedented: for the first time, regions were recognized as actors and not 
merely objects in the governance of Europe. However, a number of factors 
undermined regionalist aspirations. The weakness of the Committee of the Regions, 
the failure to extend the role of the regions in the draft Constitution and subsequent 
Treaties, the threat that European integration was seen to pose to regional 
competences, and the decreasing levels of regional funding and political 
representation to (western) regions after CEE enlargement, together signalled to 
regionalist actors that a Europe of the Regions had been merely a pipedream.  
Regional actors reacted to these developments in two ways. First, many 
regions strengthened their criticisms of certain EU policies, such as the common 
agricultural andfisheries policies, as well as the lack of democratic accountability in 
EU structures. Second, a number of regionalist parties began to radicalize their 
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demands, moving away from seeking soft forms of autonomy in an interdependent 
‘Europe of the Regions’, towards supporting outright secession. This resulted in new 
requests for the EU to intervene in guaranteeing the transition of regions towards 
independence. However, even here, the EU has been a cause of frustration and 
disappointment to regionalist actors. In its attempt to remain neutral and stay out of 
the internal affairs of its member-states, the EU has failed to make any efforts to 
adjudicate claims for the internal enlargement of the EU.  
The ironic aspect to the EU’s discomfort over the new wave of regional 
mobilisation on independence is that it may be partly to ‘blame’. In the 1990s, there 
was a possibility of accommodating demands for self-determination in a Europe of the 
Regions, whereby substate regions could sit alongside the states in the governance of 
Europe. This goal won the support of regionalist parties in Catalonia, the Basque 
Country, Veneto, Sardinia, South Tyrol and elsewhere. However, when these hopes 
were dashed with the state-reifying bias of subsequent Treaties, regionalist actors in 
all of these territories radicalized their demands in favour of independence in a 
Europe of the States. As the possibilities of regional engagement in Europe continue 
to dwindle away, independence now seems to be the only way to have real influence 
over the EU decision-making process. Indeed, in the case of Scotland, if the UK 
Government’s proposed referendum on leaving the EU wins support, the Scottish 
Government has indicated that it will hold a second referendum on independence so it 
can actually re-join the EU. However, if the European Commission and Council 
continue to ignore such demands, and regional populations do vote for independence 
without the support of European institutions, the result could rock the foundations – 
and legitimacy – of the supranational project. 
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